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COMMENTS
The Supreme Court has been cognizant of this fact and has upon
occasion attempted to clarify the issue. But a scattering of divergent
cases still leaves much doubt. The problem is an immediate one, for
the Florida courts, which have handled contempt so adequately without
legislative interference in the past, have failed to perfect the machinery
of appeal.
It is therefore submitted that the normal course of appeal be open to
those held in contempt of the lower courts of the state where there has
been a final judgment. The necessity of resorting to the extraordinary
writ of habeas corpus should clearly be removed, whether the contempt
adjudication has resulted in detention or a fine.
BARTON S. UDELL

THE FLORIDA LAW OF ASSIGNMENTS
FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS
INTRODUrION

The notion of an "assignment for benefit of creditors"' is not a new
2
one. Actually the doctrine existed at common law -although the common
law procedure itself left much to be desired. Thus, the common law
approach represented a simple procedure whereby a debtor conveyed
property to a trustee, so that the latter distributed the sales proceeds
to the creditors. : The entire proceeding was therefore a mere adaptation.
of the traditional law of trusts. 4 The unsatisfactory nature of these
proceedings was evident from the fact that partial assignments were
permitted, creditors could be preferred, and the debtor could even demand
releases from consenting creditors. 6 Definitely, the creditors were placed
6
in an undesirable position. A more satisfactory system was rcquired, and
1. The term "assignment for benefit of creditors" is a popular one, and it carries
the connotation of a general assignment (in trust) for the benefit of one's creditors,
lhus, this is the term that appears in volume 6 of Corpus Juris Secondum at page 1211,
and other reference text books. Statutes, however, vary in their terminology. For
example, FLA. STAT. c. 727 (1953) uses the title "General Assignments," although
the language of the statute repeatedly contains the phrase, "assignment for benefit of
creditors." Regardless of these differences in phraseology in Florida and elsewhere,
the theory and purpose remains the same.
2. 6 C.J.S., Assignment for Benefit of Creditors § 3.
3. McMullin v. Keogh-Doyle Meat Co, 96 Colo. 298, 42 P.2d 463 (19351.

4. Thus, this trust notion is mentioned inthe early Florida case of Bellamy v.

Bellamy's Adm'r., 6 Fla. 62 (1855).
5. For a more complete discussion, see Weintraub, Levin and Sosonoff, Assignments
for the Benefit of Creditors and Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent
Estates, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1953); and BURRILL, AssINssENTS, 23-24, 171 (6th
Ed. 1894).
6. The earliest apparent Florida case involving such assignments is Holbrook v.
During the ensuing century, only about three dozen eases
Allen, 4 Fla. 87 (1851).
were adiudicated. It is therefore apparent that situations involving an assignment
for benefit of creditors rarely found themselves in the courts. This is as it should be,
since the entire arrangement is for the purpose of achieving an amicable, unlitigated
settlement.
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in Florida and elsewherc, a process of constant statutory evolution has
produced the present fabric of law.7
Statutes vary in their degree of comprehensiveness, although the same
general objective appears everywhere. This goal is an informal, yet equitable,
system of liquidation of a debtor's estate. Thus, also, only about a halfdozen states have no statutes on the subject;" and apparently, these
jurisdictions continue to rely upon the common law.
Florida has made such statutory provision," The chapter itself is brief
enough. It only involves a single page in the compiled statutes. However,
its brevity should not detract from either its intricateness or usefulness.
Both are apparent upon a careful reading of the statute, and both will be
explored in the succeeding sections.
FORMALITIES

It always has been clear that a writing is required by the Statute of
Frauds for realty situations, but it was never too clear, at common law,
whether a writing was required for personal property transfers. The
Florida statute has now effectively settled this question.10 A writing is
required for all transfers. It is, of course, necessary that proper conveyances be executed for realty;" and in general, the same formalities
should be followed that would be used in a trust situation. 12 In one
case, the court held that delivery may precede the execution of a formal
deed, and that contemporeaneousness of (1)execution, and (2) delivery
was therefore not essential.', This was an early case, but it would appear
that the legal doctrine still prevails.
The Florida statute prohibits partial transfers. Thus, the statutory
language provides for "an equal distribution of all of the assignor's real
and personal property." 14 No mention is made of partnership situations.
However, the Florida cases require members of a partnership to transfer
both their partnership and personal properties to the assignee.' 5 Thus,
in one case, the court pointedly said:
7. An excellent tabulation of enacted statutes appears in Weintraub, Levin and

Sosonoff, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and Competitive Systems for
Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, op. cit. supra, note 5.

8.Ibid.
9. FLA. STAT. c.727 (1953).
10. FLA. STAT. § 727.01 (1953).
11. Greely v.Hull, 23 Fla. 361, 2 So. 618 (1887); Walters v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86,
76 Am. Dec. 607 (1860).
12. Greely v. Hull, 23 Fla. 361, 2 So. 618 (1887); Bradley Fertilizer Co. v. Pace,
80 Fed. 862 (5th Cir. 1897).
13. Greely v. Hull, supra note 12.
14. FrA. STAT. § 727.01 (1953). The earlier Florida cases expressly sanctioned
But the preferential
preferential transfers. See Holbrook v. Allen, 4 Fla. 87 (1851).
transfer provision has been revoked since that date. See also, Common Statutory
Regulation of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors, 47 YALE L.I. 944 (1938).
15. Sheppard v. Reeves, 39 Fla. 53, 21 So. 774 (1897); Williams v. Crocker, 36
Fla. 61, 18 So. 52 (1895).
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The individual property of members of a partnership not exempted
by law is liable for the partnership debts, and the failure to
include all such property in an assignment for the benefit of
creditors is in violation of an essential requirement of the statute.'8
It is desirable that the debtor submit a detailed inventory of both
his assigned property and his claimed exemptions. However, the submission
of a detailed inventory is not mandatory. rie assignor may simply make
a general assignment of all "affected property," and exempt property as
"allowed by law."' 7 As has been stated, the detailed inventory, although
quite desirable, is not absolutely essential.' By dicta, though, the Supreme
Court of Florida has stated that a debtor cannot take a lump-sum monetary
amount as an exemption. 19 Such a lump-sum approximation is not permitted. Rather, the debtor-assignor must be able to point to a specific
statutory section that grants him exemptions of particular items of property.
The statute provides for a distribution among creditors "in equal
proportion to their respective demands." 20 Suppose, though, that a
creditor has several claims-some of which are secured and others that are
unsecured. How are these claims affected by the assignee's disbursements
to the creditors?
In Cohen v. L'Engle,21 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the
creditor must apply the payments, pro rata, to all the obligations held by
him. Such application had to be made both to secured and unsecured
claims, and without regard to the seniority of the various claims themselves.
Likewise, it was immaterial whether or not the assignee gave directions
as to such applications. The prorata application had to be made as a
matter of law. The rule is an interesting one, and at least answers by
"case law" what has been left unanswered by the statute.
Another formality consists of the assignor's oath. 2 In this connection,
it has been held that the oath is mandatory and not directory.23 A failure
to execute the oath accordingly renders the proceedings void.2 4
The Florida statute prescribes a recordation of both the assignment
and the oath.25 Cases have not construed whether or not this is absolutely
16. H. B. Claflin Co. v. Harrison, 44 Fla. 218, 31 So. 818 (1902); Sheppard
v.Reeves, 39 Fia. 53, 55, 21 So. 774, 775 (1897).
17. Dorr v. Schmidt, 38 Fla. 354, 21 So. 279 (1896); Parker v. Cleaveland, 37 Ila.
39, 19 So. 344 (1896).
18. Frank v. Myers, 97 Ala. 437, 11 So. 832 (1892).
19. Thus, in King v.Ruble, 54 Ark. 418, 16 S.W. 7 (1891) the Supreme Court
of Arkansas refused to allow an exemption where the assignor had merely reserved $1,000
out of the proceeds". By dicta, in Dorr v.Schmidt, 38 Fla. 354, 21 So. 279 (1896),
the Supreme Court of Florida stated that it agreed with the view expressed in the
Arkansas case.
20. FLA. STAT. § 727.01 (1953).
21. 29 Fla. 655, 11 So. 44 (1892).
22. FLA. STAT. § 727.02 (1953).
23. Ibid.
24. Williams v. Crocker, 36 Fla. 61, 18 So. 52 (1895).
25. FLA. STAT. § 727.03 (1953).
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required, although the general language of the statute suggests the recordation to be mandatory.
On the whole, the formalities are simple enough. Also, the common
law spirit of flexibility and procedural informality has been preserved in
the Florida statute.
THE ASSIGNEE
It is not too clear whether the "assignee" 20 is a trustee, representative
of the creditors, assignee of the debtor, or some combination thereof.27
Exact legal semantics, though, are not of importance since the statute
prescribes both the qualifications and functions of the person designated
as an "assignee." 2 8
A great latitude of discretion is permitted in the selection of an
assignee. Apparently, all that is required is the ability to give a bond
of "double the value of the property assigned." 2 Beyond that, apparently
any person or organization is eligible for appointment. For example, this
might include natural persons, corporations or credit bureaus. One is
accordingly reminded of the liberality permitted in the appointment of an
agent or trustee.
This latitude of discretion actually works out quite well in practice.
Thus, an assignment for benefit of creditors is postulated on the proposition
that the procedure is mutually acceptable to the affected parties.?0 Dissenting creditors will usually have the prerogative of replacing the "assignmient" with remedies under the Federal Bankruptcy Act.3' Even where
the Federal Act cannot be invoked, a creditor may petition a court for
equitable relief a2 It would therefore appear that an assignor should be
careful in selecting his assignee. It is important that the assignee be
acceptable to the creditors. Any other situation invites the possibility of
the creditors replacing the "assignment for benefit of creditors" proceedings
with some other legal remedy. This replacement potential has apparently
had a salutory effect, and no noticeable difficulty has been experienced
because of the discretion permitted in naming the assignee. It might
be added that most states, including Florida, permit a wide discretion in
the naming of an assignee-with this discretion being vested in the debtorassignor.8 3

26. FLA. STAT. § 727.04 (1953)
"assignee" is used in the discussion in 6
27. Bertensham v. Klag. 117 Kan.
for Benefit of Creditors § 181(a).
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 727.04, 727.05,
29. FLA. STAT. § 727.04 (1953).

30. Comment, 36

CALIF.

L.

REV.

uses the term "assignee."
Likewise, the term
C.I.S. 1211-1434.
176, 231 Pac. 73 (1924); 6 C.J.S. Assignment
727.06, 727.07, 727.08 (1953).

586 (1948).

31. 30 SrAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
32. Armstrong v.Holland, 35 Fla. 160, 17 So. 366 (1895).
33. Common Statutory Regulation of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors,
op. cit. supra note 5.
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As a point of comparative interest, it should be noted that a previous
Nebraska statute34 formed an exception to this general rule of "wide
discretion." Thus, in Nebraska, the debtor made his assignment to the
sheriff. The sheriff then summoned a conference of creditors, and they
elected a trustee.85 It appears that the Nebraska statute attempted to
superimpose some of the Federal Bankruptcy Act 38 procedures. The
Nebraska approach was interesting-although one might question the
desirability of imposing such formalities upon what has traditionally been
an informal proceeding. There would appear to be little advantage in
adopting this procedure in Florida.
The bond requirement in Florida is worthy of note. Thus, the assignee
3
must give a bond of double the value of the property assignedY.
The
requirement is analogously imposed by statutes in other jurisdictions. It
would appear that the necessity of a bond does much to engender a feeling
of confidence among the creditors. Also, since the assignee is functioning
under the surveillance of the court, it would appear completely proper that
there be a bond. 38 Bonds are customarily required where there is such a
judicial supervision.
It is not clear, however, what would happen if the assignee failed
to give a bond.39 It would seem that any affected creditor could demand
compliance with the bonding statute. Since the statute is designed to
protect the creditors, a creditor should be able to insist upon its safeguards.
The assignee is required to give notice to the affected creditors. The
statute is quite inflexible in its details.4 0 In this connection, the statute
is also broad enough to provide a means of notifying non-resident creditors.
One Florida case 4' has stated that such non-residents are bound by the
statute when they voluntarily submit their claims, and thereby share in
pro rata proceeds from the debtor's estate. By dicta, the same decision
stated that non-residents could claim immunity from the law if they
refused to participate in the liquidation. It would appear that further
litigation, either in Florida or elsewhere, must settle the extraterritorial
effect of an assignment for the benefit of creditors. At this point, the
2
law of such extraterritorial effect has not been crystallized.4

34. NEB. CoNIP. § 6-105, 110 (1929).
35. § 6-105 (repealed, 1945), of NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1929).
36. 30 STAT: 559 (1898), as amcnded, 11 U.S.C. 91 (1952).
37. FLA. STAT. § 727.04 (1953).
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 727.07, 727.08 (1953) pertain to financial statements submitted
to the court and the discharge of the assignor. This would appear, to indicate a court
surveillance.
39. 6 C.J.S. Assignments for Benefit of Creditors § 174 (1937), for citations to
divergent viewpoints on problems that have arisen elsewhere.
40. FLA. STAT. § 727.05 (1953).
41. Rosenheim v. Morrow, 37 Fla. 183, 20 So. 243 (1896).
42. 6 C.I.S. Assignments for Benefit of Creditors §169 (1937).
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ADMINISTRATION

The administration of an assignment is described by the statute in
simple, general terms. Thus, the section provides:
The said assignee shall as soon as the foregoing provision have
been complied with, proceed to dispose of all the property
mentioned in the deed of assignment to him, to the best interest
of all parties concerned, either at public or private sale, as to him
may seem best, and to collect and to recover by law, or otherwise,
all debts due the assignor in the same manner as said assignor might
or could do in his own right if such assignment had not been
made, and for this purpose
said assignee may employ an attorney
4
to prosecute such claim.
It should be noted that the broadest sort of discretion is vested in
the assignee. This applies both as to the sale of properties and the payment
of claims. No mandate of creditor priorities is recited in the statute.
Indeed, there is avoided the complex system of priorities that appears in
the Federal Bankruptcy Act.44 As far as a Florida assignment for benefit
of creditors is concerned, the assignee need only divide the proceeds "among
'4
the creditors in proportion to their respective demands.
The Florida statute expressly authorizes the employment of an attorney
if necessary.48 It would seem that the employment of other assistants
would likewise be permissible, although no cases have raised this problem.
It is axiomatic that an express power carries with it the implied powers
to effectuate it. The employment of assistants might accordingly be regarded
as such an implied power.
The Florida statute provides for the filing of seni-annual financial
statements.4 7 No particular form is prescribed, except that such statements
must be executed under oath. The adequacy of the financial statement is
therefore left to the discretion of the supervising court. As a point of
interest, it should be noted that very detailed financial statement requirements are specified in the Trust Accounting Law,48 although it would seem
that no greater fiduciary responsibility prevails in these trust accounting
situations.
The final section of the Florida statute 49 provides for a discharge of
the assignee-upon proper petition to the court. The discharge procedure
is reasonable enough. It emphasizes the fiduciary nature of the assignee's
duties and his responsibilities to the court. As a corollary, a court that
administers a liquidation should eventually finish the job by discharging
(or "surcharging") the person responsible for the administration. The
43. FLA. STAT. § 727.06 (1953).
44. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 104 (1952).
45. FLA. STAT. § 727.02 (1953).
46. FLA. STAT. § 727.06 (1953).
47. FLA. STAT. § 727.07 (1953).
48. FLA. STAT. § 737.12 (1953).
49. FLA. STAT. § 727.08 (1953).
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discharge procedure (followed in Florida) is a desirable practice-although
one that is not generally used in other jurisdictions.,"
CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, the Florida statute is brief. That is desirable.
Verbosity does not always assure effectiveness; often, as here, a selective
use of a few words represents the best approach.
Experience has indicated that the common law procedure is unsatisfactory. The Florida statute has cured these common law shortcomings.
A question arises, though, as to whether the common law procedure is
available in addition to the statutory provisions of Chapter 727. Actually,
this question was raised in a leading New York case. 5' In that instance,
the New York court held that the statutory system had completely supplanted the common law procedure. The court pointedly stated that the
common law procedure could not be used after the enactment of a statute
governing an assignment for benefit of creditors. 2 It would appear that
a similar result should prevail if the question is raised in Florida. The
rationale advanced by the New York court would seem to apply with equal
force in Florida.
The assignment for benefit of creditors offers the attraction of liquidation without stigma. Rehabilitation of the debtor can be accomplished
informally and expeditiously; and certainly, much of the harshness of f
bankruptcy proceeding is avoided. 53 Administration expenses can also be
minimized,"4 and this too is an attraction of an assignment proceeding
Like compromises and out-of-court settlements, the assignment for benefit
of creditors should be encouraged.
An analysis of the Florida statute governing such assignments 5 indicates
an adequate framework of laws. However, as a practical concern, a legislative
remedy, as to the amount of the bond required, is of obvious necessity
50. Comment, 36 CALIF. L. Ruv. 586 (1948).
51. Lupensky v. Hoffman, 158 Misc. 261, 284 N.Y.S. 549 (Sup. Ct., special term
Bronx County, 1934), aff'd 246 App. Div. 803, 285 N.Y.S. 1074 (1st Dep't, 1936).
52. The following quotation appears in 158 Misc. 261, at 262, 284 N.Y.S. 549,
at 580:

The only manner in which the property of a debtor may be assigned
and distributed for the benefit of creditors is in accordance with the provisions

of the Debtor and Creditor law; otherwise this law would iust be a fancy
collection of words to be observed or not observed according to the whims
and follies of the debtor and his select group of creditors. The Debtor and
Creditor law contains minute specifications of each step in an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. The Appellate Division o this department has
simplified the statute law by a code of rules which must be observed in

the handling of debtor's estates.
53. For a factual study of the disadvantages of bankruptcy, see Billig, Vhat Price
Bankruptcy: A Plea for Friendly Adjustment, 14 CORNELL L.P. 413 (1929).
54. Some states allow a fixed percentage of liquidated asset values as a fee. E.g.,
5-10%

is allowed in Arkansas (ARK.

STAT.,

1947, § 36-308); and

in Vest Virginia (W. Va. CODE, 1949, § 3946(16).
mention a percentage for a liquidation fee.
55. FLA. STAT. c. 727 (1953).

-5% is allowed

The Florida statute does not
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to make the statute fully beneficial. 5 Certainly, also, this assignment
possibility should be explored by creditors before resorting to the harshness
of a Federal Bankruptcy liquidation. It should likewise be remembered
that the Federal Bankruptcy Act 57 can be used to prod more informal
arrangements under state laws. This prodding function is one of the
purposes of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, the mere presence
of the Federal Act does not mean that it should be used at the first
indication of financial illness. Rather, the Federal statute should represent
a course of last resort to be followed only after an assignment (or other
informal proceeding) has been considered. The rehabilitation of debtors,
like lawsuits, should follow a methodical course. The harshest remedies
(such as bankruptcy) should accordingly be reserved as a final alternative.
JULIUS JAY PERLMUrrER

LIQUIDATED DAMAGE PROVISIONS
IN LEASE CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION

With the increasing urbanization of American life and the tendency
for population to center in large metropolitan areas, the instrumentality
bf the lease has gained greatly in economic importance. This is in large
part due to the phenomenal rise in land values, requiring a large cash
investment on the part of the purchaser. Another important factor is the
ease and convenience of leasing rather than purchasing, since the term
can be adjusted to meet the needs of the parties; thus it becomes unnecessary
for an individual to obligate himself far into the future. These are important considerations in a dynamic and ever-changing economy.
Since the investment by the lessee is small and the lessor's only
recourse in case of default is a personal action, with the resultant inconveniences and difficulties in terms of time and money, various devices have
been used by lessors to secure against loss due to non-performance by the
56. The author believes two recommendations suggest themselves:
l-hat
a greater use be made of this feature of the law to aid the debtor
seeking relief.
2-'[hat the legislature be made aware of the obstacle to the use of this statute,
namely, the requirement for the assignee to post a bond twice the amount of the assets
involved, making it costly, inequitable and difficult to get a responsible person who
would be willing to act as assignee at such great personal risk and expense. It is the
author's finn belief that if enough attorneys, or the Florida Bar through appropriate
means, call this to the attcntion of the legislature, our legislators will, as they should,

amend this ancient statute in one simple but important phase-to permit bonds in a
reasonable amount.

This will be more in line with bonds as required of Federal Receivers or Trustees,
i.e., $25,000 bond in an estate having assets in excess of $1,000,000. At any rate, it is
suggested that bonds be required on a more realistic basis, perhaps, 25% or even as
little as 10% of the amount of the assets involved in the assignment proceedings.
57. 52 STAT. 905-907 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 701-28 (1952).

